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Abstract
This paper sets out to study the role of cultural and institutional differences across European countries in
explaining patterns of bilateral trade within Europe by using a gravity model approach on panel data for 24
European countries, covering the years 2002 through 2006. It may be expected that cultural and institutional
“distance” between Eurozone countries would have a comparatively smaller impact on bilateral trade flows by
virtue of the countries’ shared currency relative to the impact of such determinants on bilateral trade flows
between two countries that do not share a currency. Alternatively, such determinants could have a significant
impact on Eurozone trade flows, which might imply that the euro currency union is ill fit for this area whose
countries are culturally and institutionally diverse.
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper sets out to study the role of cultural and institutional differences across 
European countries in explaining patterns of bilateral trade within Europe. This 
paper will do so by using a gravity model approach on panel data for 24 European 
countries, covering the years 2002 through 2006. It may be expected that cultural 
and institutional “distance” between Eurozone countries would have a 
comparatively smaller impact on bilateral trade flows by virtue of the countries’ 
shared currency relative to the impact of such determinants on bilateral trade 
flows between two countries that do not share a currency. Alternatively, such 
determinants could have a significant impact on Eurozone trade flows, which 
might imply that the euro currency union is ill fit for this area whose countries are 
culturally and institutionally diverse.  
By measuring and comparing the sensitivity of Eurozone and non-
Eurozone bilateral trade flows to measures of cultural and institutional distance 
and institutional quality, one can also gain insight into how well the adoption of a 
common currency by Eurozone countries has fostered a single market and 
encouraged synchronization of Eurozone business cycles. The results of this 
analysis may then have implications for how effectively the Eurozone could 
develop further into a so-called single market for trade.  
In order to contextualize and justify this inquiry, a literature review 
(Section 2) follows that first recounts the origin of the concept of a single market 
for Europe and then subsequently shows how the level of intra-European trade 
was invoked as a key determinant in convergence prospects of the initial entrants 
of the Eurozone. I then review research on the relationship of trade flows and 
business cycle synchronization, as well as initial estimates of the effect of 
Eurozone membership on trade. I then relate those estimates to estimates of the 
level of business cycle convergence among Eurozone countries. Finally, I discuss 
certain studies that have sought to isolate and measure cultural and institutional 
determinants of bilateral trade flows in the gravity model of trade. The remainder 
of the paper then has the following structure. In Section 3, I will describe the 
dataset I use. In Section 4, I will detail the gravity model strategy. In Section 5, I 
will present and summarize my results, and Section 6 will include a brief 
discussion and conclusion.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
A European single market has its legislative origin in the Single European Act of 
1986, which set a goal of creating a single market for the European Union by 
1993. Its creation included removing trade barriers and controls between member 
countries and encouraging freer labor mobility and circulation of services. 
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(European Commission 2012). This single market was dynamized in 1999 with 
the creation of a common currency for what are now 19 of the European Union’s 
28 member countries. The euro was heralded for its potential to reduce currency 
exchange costs and risks of trade, though whether these features have led outright 
to increased levels of trade is a question considered below (European Commission 
2012). 
But the question of whether Europe is in fact an optimal area for a 
common currency has been long debated—indeed, Robert Mundell’s pioneering 
paper on optimal currency areas (OCAs) cited opposing views on this topic in 
1961 (Mundell, 1961, p.661). More recently, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
“operationalized” OCA theory to predict the readiness of the relevant EU 
countries for adoption of a common currency by showing that the theoretical 
determinants of exchange rate variability between two countries (similarity in 
trade composition, deviations in real output over time, relative size of economies) 
have empirical significance, and thus permit forecasting. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen’s OCA index is based on a measure of a country’s relative exchange 
rate variability and thus maintains a negative relationship with Eurozone 
readiness. For the most part, the authors forecasted convergence of the Eurozone 
participants’ economies over time and in line with expectations as detailed in the 
Maastricht Treaty. However, their finding that much of the difference in the OCA 
index across countries can be attributed to differences in bilateral trade, with 
higher levels of intra-European trade associated with promising convergence 
prospects, supports the inquiry of this research paper. As Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen point out, a more complete Single Market, visible in the form of 
higher levels of EU bilateral trade, would encourage better convergence 
prospects, and vice versa.  
Additionally, Frankel and Rose (1998) have shown that, historically, 
greater levels of bilateral trade between countries are associated with greater 
synchronization between those economies’ business cycles. Yet, Frankel and 
Rose explain, because entry into an OCA such as the Eurozone could increase 
intra-OCA trade and therefore result in greater synchronization post-accession, it 
may be best to judge integration prospects ex post. Thus, by dealing with trade 
flows in the Eurozone relative to trade flows in other regions in the years after the 
adoption of the euro, this paper could have implications for the synchronization of 
Eurozone business cycles.  
Furthermore, Clark and van Wincoop (2001) compared correlations of 
employment and output levels as a measure of business cycle synchronization 
between EU countries and between the nine U.S. Census regions in the later 
decades of the 20th century. The authors find that, while U.S Census region 
business cycles appeared to be more synchronized than the relevant EU countries 
due to the lack of national borders between Census regions, much of this “border 
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effect” on synchronization arose from comparatively lower levels of trade among 
EU countries.   
The question of whether the euro has had a significant impact on trade 
flows within the Eurozone has been a source of debate in the relevant literature. In 
an article for the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Reuven Glick and 
Andrew Rose (2015) provide a concise overview of recent findings. After Rose 
(2000) found on average a near tripling of trade after entry into a currency union, 
different methods of analysis and several meta-analyses have consistently found a 
smaller currency union effect on trade, and widely varying and potentially 
diminishing estimates for the Eurozone in particular. The authors conclude that 
the magnitude and occasionally even the sign of a euro effect on trade depend on 
the econometric methodology used. In their view, the euro has had a positive but 
modest impact on exports for Eurozone countries.  
Such a weak trade effect could contribute to the lack of additional 
synchronization in Eurozone countries’ business cycles post-euro adoption. 
Indeed, Camacho et al. (2006) conclude, based on the recent literature, that 
“trade-linkages are relevant in explaining [business cycle] comovements,” but use 
several different measurement methodologies of business cycle correlation to 
conclude “there are no appreciable gains in synchronization among the Eurozone 
countries in the last decade” (Camacho et al. p.1701, p.1695). De Haan et al. 
(2007) provide an extensive overview of studies on business cycle convergence in 
Europe and conclude that the evidence for greater synchronization in the 
Eurozone is weighted almost equally with opposing evidence, and that much 
depends on timeframe and method. The authors then show that most studies find 
trade intensity to be the most significant driver of business cycle convergence. 
The strategy of using non-traditional variables to explain trade flows has 
its origin in the gravity model of trade, pioneered by Dutch economist Jan 
Tinbergen in 1962, which predicts bilateral trade flows that are based on the 
relative size and proximity of the involved economies, measured using GDP, 
actual land area, and other measurements. Subsequent research has shown that 
many variables measuring “similarity” of economies can significantly predict the 
level of trade between countries as well. 
Srivastava and Green (1986) are motivated by Linnemann’s influential 
1966 study of innovative determinants of international trade, and thus include 
such factors as religion and language in studying bilateral trade determinants. The 
authors explain that the tendency for large economies, measured by level of gross 
output, to trade with other large economies is obvious and could “overwhelm” the 
impact of other country characteristics (p.625). Thus to combat this, they use as a 
dependent variable an index that is a ratio of actual trade intensity between two 
countries to expected intensity. By scaling actual bilateral trade flows between, 
for example, country X and country Y with respect to the proportion of trade 
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country X engages in with all countries, the authors try to neutralize the 
overpowering impact of the most trade happening between the largest economies. 
While they find that distance still significantly determines trade flows, the authors 
also find significant roles for political instability of exporting countries (varies 
negatively with trade intensity) and similar language and religion (varies 
positively).        
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) are concerned with “insecurity in 
international trade,” and accordingly, they develop a model that takes into account 
the quality of a country’s legal system (specifically, its ability to enforce 
commercial contracts) and the transparency of a country’s government in 
impacting relative import demand. They use data from the World Economic 
Forum’s Executive Survey, which includes questions relevant to the institutional 
aspects of a country as cited above. The authors find that institutional differences 
that result in varying levels of “security” in carrying out trade transactions impact 
international trade patterns. The authors assert that their findings may help to 
explain why high-income countries disproportionately engage in trade with other 
high-income countries—there exists safer trade opportunities between countries 
of this sort than between high-income and low-income countries, which typically 
have less hospitable institutional conditions for trade.  De Groot et al. (2004) 
confirm the importance of including a measure of institutional quality and 
similarity in gravity model specification by showing, in line with Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002), that such a measure does much to explain why high-income 
countries tend to trade more with each other 
Linders et al. (2005) expand on this topic by using a nuanced measure of 
cultural dissimilarity, Geert Hofstede’s 1980 index based on a comparison of IBM 
employees’ views in 40 countries on 4 values based questions, as well as 
measures of institutional quality and institutional similarity between two 
countries, which are also based on a quality scores. The authors construct a 
standard gravity model, and then add in dummies for common language, colonial 
history, religion, and borders. They find that additional variables are all 
significant and positively related to bilateral trade flows, though GDP sizes and 
distance still explain a majority of the variance in bilateral trade flows. When they 
add their measures of cultural and institutional “distance” to the gravity 
specification, they find expectedly that institutional similarity and quality varies 
positively with trade flows, and curiously, that cultural dissimilarity varies 
positively and significantly with the trade flows variable. Their explanation of this 
unexpected relationship between cultural dissimilarity and bilateral trade flows is 
that culturally distant countries may also experience high costs of domestic 
production, and thus would choose to trade instead. This explanation does not 
seem completely sensible and they note the cultural dissimilarity variable explains 
relatively little of the overall variation in bilateral trade flows between countries.    
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In this literature review, I have tried to move sequentially in constructing 
the basis for my inquiry. To recount, the euro was established to strengthen the 
European single market by reducing exchange rate costs and risks between 
Eurozone countries. However, research showed that the probability of successful 
convergence of the potential Eurozone countries increased with the level of intra-
Eurozone trade. And quite often, business cycle synchronization between two 
countries increases with the intensity of their trade relationship. I then recounted 
the fact that the euro effect on trade, overall, has been found to be modestly 
positive, and that business cycle synchronization among Eurozone countries has 
not been found outright to have increased. Finally, I surveyed some of the 
literature that incorporates measures of cultural distance and institutional quality 
into gravity model explanations of trade flows. Thus, whether cultural and 
institutional differences among Eurozone countries have had an impact on their 
bilateral trade patterns, despite a shared currency, might partially reveal reasons 
for the lackluster measurements of a euro effect on trade, and by extension, weak 
business cycle synchronization in the Eurozone.  
 
3. The Dataset 
 
The dataset I use was obtained from Andrew K. Rose’s website1, filtered to only 
include 24 European countries, and then augmented with additional variables 
specific to interest of this paper. The dataset covers the years 2002 to 2006, during 
which time the Euro currency was fully in circulation in 11 of the countries in my 
sample and not for the other 13 countries. See Appendix A for the list of 
countries.  
The dataset includes the standard gravity model variables for each country 
(see Appendix B). For example, real GDP and GDP per capita in USD, the value 
of Free on Board exports and Cost, Insurance, and Freight imports between the 
country pair in constant USD, the straight line distance between the country pair’s 
capitals, a dummy that is 1 if the countries share a language, a dummy that is 1 if 
the countries share a border, and so on. To detect the impact of being in the 
Eurozone, I create a dummy that is 1 if one country in a pair is a Eurozone 
member, and 0 otherwise, and a dummy that is 1 if both countries are Eurozone 
members, and 0 otherwise. I follow Linders (2005) closely in selecting measures 
of cultural distance, institutional quality, and institutional distance, which I now 
will discuss. 
 As a measure of culture across countries, I use Geert Hofstede’s 
dimensions of national culture, which were originally compiled in 1980 by 
surveying IBM employees in 40 different countries on the topics of power 
                                                        
1 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#Reverse 
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distance, uncertainty, individualism vs. collectivism, and masculinity vs. 
femininity to create 4 dimensions of culture. The dimension scores, which range 
from 0 to 100, are updated periodically and have been expanded to over 80 
countries. See Appendix B and Linders (2005) for a more in-depth discussion of 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture.  
It is worth noting that the availability of Hofstede’s data was a limiting 
factor in selecting my sample. Countries such as Croatia, Cyprus, and Iceland 
were missing from the dimensions dataset to which I had access, which forced me 
to omit these countries from my sample.  
I use the six dimensions of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) to create a measure of institutional quality and distance between 
country pairs. Scores for each dimension range from -2.5 to 2.5, and the 
dimensions include, for example, measures of the political stability of a country’s 
government and its ability to limit corruption. Again, see Appendix B and Linders 
(2005) for a more in-depth discussion of the WGI. The institutional quality of a 
country is calculated as the average of the country’s scores across the six 
dimensions.  
While Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the WGI provide an indication 
of national culture and institutional quality for each individual country, 
respectively, it is the interest of this paper to obtain a measure of “distance” 
between the two countries in a trading partnership. To do so, I employ the method 
described in Kogut and Singh (1988), where “distance” is calculated as the 
average of the differences in dimension scores between a country pair, with each 
difference being scaled by the variance of that dimension’s scores across all 
countries. Symbolically, for a measure with c = 4 dimensions, the distance 
between countryi and countryj, is, 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 =
1
4
∑(𝐶𝑐𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑗)
2/𝑉𝑐
4
𝑐=1
 
, where Cci is the score for countryi on the cth dimension, Ccj is the score for 
countryj on the cth dimension,  and Vc is the variance of the score of that 
dimension across all countries. I carry out this calculation for the dimensions of 
both the cultural and institutional measures. Germany and Switzerland are 
culturally the most proximate of any country pair, with a cultural distance 
measure of 0.028. On the other hand, Denmark and the Slovak Republic are 
culturally the most distant of any country pair, with a cultural distance measure of 
7.90. Institutionally, Sweden and Switzerland are the most proximate with a 
distance of 0.024. Finland and Romania are institutionally the most distant, with a 
distance of 10.03.  
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4. The Strategy 
 
As was detailed in Section 2, the gravity model of trade has been used extensively 
to predict the magnitude of bilateral trade flows based on characteristics of the 
two countries that are trading, and it will be used in this paper as well. The gravity 
model of trade is inspired by Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation, and has as 
its basic form: 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝐺(
𝑀𝑖
𝛽1 ×𝑀𝑗
𝛽2
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛽3
) 
,where Tij is some measure of the volume of trade from countryi  to countryj, G is 
a constant term, M represents the “economic mass” of countryi and countryj, 
typically GDP, and Dij isthe distance between the two countries. This equation is 
then typically log transformed to take the following form: 
 
ln(𝑇𝑖𝑗) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ln( 𝑀𝑖) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑀𝑗) − 𝛽3 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑗) +  𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 
This form allows for an OLS estimation in which the 𝛽 coefficients on the natural 
log of continuous variables represent elasticities between those variables and the 
dependent variable; as in, a 1% increase in Mi (typically GDP of countryi) is 
associated with a 𝛽1 % increase in trade from countryi to countryj. The 
specification of the full gravity equation for this analysis is as follows: 
 
ln 𝑐(𝑇12𝑡) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ln( 𝐺𝐷𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝑡) + 𝛽3 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑐𝑎𝑝1𝑡)
+ 𝛽4 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑐𝑎𝑝2𝑡) + 𝛽5 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡12) + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟12 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔12
+ 𝛽8𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡12 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡12 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑄1 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑄2 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐸𝑍12
+ 𝛽12𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑍12𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝐵13−16𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 
 
To reiterate certain variable details from Section 32,  
- T12t is the FOB exports in standard USD from country 1 to country 2 in 
year t 
- Border is 1 if country 1 and country 2 share a land border, 0 otherwise 
- Lang is 1 if a country pair shares a dominant language, 0 otherwise 
- InstDist12 is the distance between a country pair’s quality of 
governance and institutions 
- 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡12 is the distance between a country pair’s national culture 
- 𝐼𝑄 is a country’s institutional quality 
                                                        
2 See Appendix B for full dataset description 
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- SingleEZ12 is 1 if one of the countries in the country pair uses the 
Euro, and 0 otherwise 
- DualEZ12 is 1 if both of the countries in the country pair uses the Euro, 
and 0 otherwise 
- Interactions include the following interaction terms: (SingleEZ x 
CultDist), (DualEZ x CultDist), (SingleEZ x InstDist), and (DualEZ x 
InstDist) 
 
The main variables of interest are 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡12 and InstDist12, the dummy variables 
SingleEZ12 and DualEZ12, the IQ variables, and the interaction terms. The 
interaction terms will indicate if there is a significantly different impact of cultural 
and institutional distance on trade depending on whether there are 0,1, or 2 
Eurozone members in the trading pair. Note that the impact on a log-transformed 
dependent variable of a non-log transformed variable in an OLS estimate is, in 
percent, the following: 
 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = (𝑒𝛽𝑖 − 1)×100% 
 
For example, a coefficient of 0.50 on the Border dummy would imply countries 
that share a landlocked border engage in 65% more trade than those that do not. 
Having detailed the estimating equation of this gravity model analysis, I will 
summarize the results of analyses in Section 5. 
 
5. Results 
 
I first run a basic specification of the gravity model and then add a dummy 
variable indicating if the country pair shares a land border, and then a dummy 
variable indicating whether the country pair shares a language. The results are 
below, in Table 13. 
As is typical in gravity model estimations, these regressions result in high 
R-squared statistics and high t-statistics. A 1% increase in the exporting country’s 
GDP increases trade between a country pair by 0.97%, and by 0.81% for a 1% 
increase in the importing country’s GDP. Distance decreases the amount of trade 
between a country pair, while country pairs that share a border trade 33% more 
with each other than countries that do not. The results from adding a common 
language dummy indicate that country pairs that share a language trade 16% less 
than pairs that do not, though the coefficient on this dummy is the only one to not 
                                                        
3 Standard R-squared measures are included for all regressions ran in this paper; 
adjusted R-squared measures were calculated and were insignificantly different 
from the R-squared listed. 
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be significant at the 1% across all three regressions. Moreover, this negative 
relationship could arise from the nature of this sample, where few countries share 
a language, allowing certain country pairs to greatly influence this relationship. 
After controlling for common language, the border effect on trade increases to 
39%, implying that some omitted variable bias was introduced by failing to 
include these dummies jointly. 
 
Table 1. Basic Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Basic Model Border Common Language 
    
Log GDP Exporter 0.967*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 
 (64.41) (64.43) (64.43) 
Log GDP Importer 0.813*** 0.808*** 0.803*** 
 (52.12) (52.35) (50.76) 
Log GDP/cap Exporter 0.471*** 0.473*** 0.486*** 
 (14.89) (15.06) (15.22) 
Log GDP/cap Importer 0.610*** 0.612*** 0.626*** 
 (20.08) (20.30) (20.03) 
Log Distance -1.362*** -1.262*** -1.264*** 
 (-47.38) (-32.25) (-32.28) 
Border dummy  0.282*** 0.331*** 
  (5.104) (5.843) 
Language dummy   -0.163** 
   (-2.433) 
Constant -42.10*** -42.66*** -42.78*** 
 (-59.25) (-58.23) (-58.47) 
    
Observations 2,757 2,757 2,757 
R-squared 0.880 0.880 0.881 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, dependent variable: log(exports 1 to 2) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Following Linders (2005) and Helpman et. al. (2004), as a way to measure 
the contribution of each variable to the overall variance in trade between country 
pairs, and in doing so, put the coefficient estimates in perspective4, I calculate a 
standardized beta coefficient, 𝛽𝑆𝑖, for each independent variable.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 Which is needed, given that the gravity model produces coefficient estimates that are usually 
significant at the highest levels across the board. 
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This calculation takes the following form, 
 
𝛽𝑆𝑖 =
𝛽𝑖×𝜎𝑆𝑖
𝜎log (𝐸𝑥𝑝12)
×100% 
 
, where the estimated beta is multiplied by the standard deviation of the 
independent variable it is associated with and is scaled by the standard deviation 
of the dependent variable, which is log of exports from country 1 to country 2. 
See Appendix C, Table I for the full table of standardized betas. The table shows 
that the GDP of the importer and exporter countries (which, in terms of Newton’s 
original gravity equation, is their “mass”) accounts for a large part of variation in 
trade across country pairs, as does the distance between countries.  
 In Table 2, I add the cultural distance, institutional distance, and 
institutional quality measures to the gravity model specification sequentially. In 
Model 1, the coefficient on cultural distance is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, implying that country pairs that are culturally more distant trade less. The 
measure of institutional distance is added in Model 2 and is not significant even at 
the 10% level, implying that institutional distance between country pairs in 
Europe does not impact trade flows.  
However, after adding measures of exporter and importer institutional 
quality in Model 3 (which have a significantly positive impact on trade), the 
coefficient on institutional distance becomes significant at the 1% level, implying 
that, holding constant the quality of institutions in country pairs, institutional 
distance does have some role, albeit a small one, to play in determining trade 
flows. It is also worth noting that the coefficient on GDP per capita in both the 
exporting and importing country of a country pair decreases when the measures of 
institutional quality in the country pair are included in the estimation.  Indeed, 
GDP per capita in the importing country becomes insignificant in Model 3, 
indicating that institutional quality and GDP per capita, interpreted as the 
“wealth” of a country, are highly correlated, and as Anderson and Marcouiller 
(2002) have shown, help to explain why high-income countries trade 
disproportionately more with each other.  
The standardized contributions of the independent variables in Model 3 to 
variations in trade are listed in Appendix C, Table II. GDPs and distance still 
make the largest contributions to the variation in trade between countries, yet the 
institutional and cultural determinants contribute between 2% and 14%, with the 
institutional qualities of the countries in a pair having the greatest impact on the 
variation in trade flows.  
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Table 2. Estimates with Cultural and Institutional Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Cultural Distance Institutional 
Distance 
Institutional Quality 
    
Log GDP Exporter 0.964*** 0.964*** 0.992*** 
 (64.39) (64.34) (64.71) 
Log GDP Importer 0.807*** 0.811*** 0.881*** 
 (51.23) (47.56) (50.08) 
Log GDP/cap Exporter 0.490*** 0.498*** 0.270*** 
 (15.53) (15.42) (7.399) 
Log GDP/cap Importer 0.583*** 0.564*** 0.0134 
 (18.27) (14.90) (0.244) 
Log Distance -1.238*** -1.232*** -1.222*** 
 (-32.24) (-30.73) (-32.89) 
Border dummy 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.288*** 
 (5.484) (5.487) (5.002) 
Language dummy -0.168** -0.165** -0.223*** 
 (-2.490) (-2.445) (-3.387) 
Cultural Distance -0.0518*** -0.0487*** -0.0668*** 
 (-4.779) (-4.007) (-5.521) 
Institutional Distance  -0.00872 -0.0278*** 
  (-0.836) (-2.833) 
Inst. Quality Exporter   0.650*** 
   (15.85) 
Inst. Quality Importer   0.339*** 
   (7.799) 
Constant -42.56*** -42.58*** -38.46*** 
 (-57.39) (-57.07) (-49.29) 
    
Observations 2,757 2,757 2,757 
R-squared 0.882 0.882 0.891 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, dependent variable: log(exports 1 to 2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In Table 3, I add the dummies of interest indicating how many of the 
countries in a trading pair were members of the Eurozone for the period 2002-
2006. Model 1 is the full specification so far, and the same as column 3 in Table 
2. Model 2 includes the 1 Eurozone Member dummy and the 2 Eurozone 
Members dummy. The results indicate that a country pair in which one of the 
countries uses the Euro will trade 12% more than a country pair in which neither 
country uses the Euro. And, a country pair in which both countries use the Euro 
will trade 30% more than a country pair in which neither country uses the Euro. It 
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is worth noting that the trade increase from doubling the amount of countries in a 
pair that use the Euro (from 1 to 2) more than doubles the predicted amount of 
trade between the country pair (12% to 30%). This implies that there exists some 
amount of synergy among Eurozone countries, relative to the amount of trade that 
occurs between Eurozone countries and non-Eurozone European countries.  
 
Table 3. Estimates with Eurozone Member Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full Model Eurozone Dummies Without Institutional Quality Controls 
Log GDP Exporter 0.992*** 0.979*** 0.959*** 
 (64.71) (63.94) (63.27) 
Log GDP Importer 0.881*** 0.867*** 0.805*** 
 (50.08) (47.30) (43.89) 
Log GDP/cap Exporter 0.270*** 0.217*** 0.486*** 
 (7.399) (5.481) (13.85) 
Log GDP/cap Importer 0.0134 -0.0700 0.553*** 
 (0.244) (-1.252) (14.42) 
Log Distance -1.222*** -1.276*** -1.250*** 
 (-32.89) (-30.10) (-27.33) 
Border dummy 0.288*** 0.221*** 0.296*** 
 (5.002) (3.575) (4.777) 
Language dummy -0.223*** -0.200*** -0.157** 
 (-3.387) (-3.050) (-2.331) 
Cultural Distance -0.0668*** -0.0627*** -0.0469*** 
 (-5.521) (-5.300) (-3.912) 
Institutional Distance -0.0278*** -0.0263*** -0.00761 
 (-2.833) (-2.632) (-0.712) 
Inst. Quality Exporter 0.650*** 0.692***  
 (15.85) (16.95)  
Inst. Quality Importer 0.339*** 0.380***  
 (7.799) (8.614)  
1 EZ Member dummy  0.115** 0.0420 
  (2.552) (0.902) 
2 EZ Members dummy  0.261*** 0.0788 
  (4.617) (1.339) 
Constant -38.46*** -36.24*** -42.00*** 
 (-49.29) (-37.69) (-45.47) 
Observations 2,757 2,757 2,757 
R-squared 0.891 0.892 0.882 
Robust t-stats in parentheses, dependent variable: log(exp 1 to 2); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
But, Model 3, which excludes the measures of institutional quality in the 
exporting and importing country, shows that those variables in fact strengthen the 
Eurozone impact on trade in both size and significance. Indeed, in Model 3, the 
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coefficients on the Eurozone dummies decrease substantially and become 
insignificant. This implies that the institutional quality in the exporting and 
importing is related the Eurozone status of countries in a trading pair. This makes 
sense, as Eurozone countries are likely to have stronger institutions given the 
requirements imposed on countries looking to adopt the euro. Excluding these 
measures of institutional quality leads to omitted variable bias in estimating the 
impact Eurozone membership on trade volume between a country pair.  
Table 4 shows results from a regression with interaction terms between the 
Eurozone membership dummies and cultural and institutional distance. Recall that 
an interaction term between a dummy variable and a continuous variable indicates 
the added effect of the continuous variable on the dependent variable given that 
the dummy variable is equal to 1. Accordingly, the impact of cultural distance on 
trade flows between two Eurozone countries is not statistically different from 
when neither of the countries is in the Eurozone. When only one of the countries 
uses the euro, the coefficient on the interaction term is significant and positive, 
meaning the impact of cultural distance on trade flows is decreased when one 
country in a trading pair is in the Eurozone. This result could indicate that, all 
other things equal, the membership of a country in the Eurozone mitigates trade 
deterrence caused by cultural dissimilarity—the adoption of the euro might signal 
attractiveness to non-Eurozone countries, but among trade pairs where both 
countries are in the Eurozone, this signal is not relevant. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms between Eurozone membership and institutional distance are in 
fact significant and positive.  
When both countries in a trading pair belong to the Eurozone, the negative 
impact of institutional distance on trade flows is reduced. In other words, it 
appears that for trading pairs with Eurozone member countries, institutional 
distance has a smaller role to play in determining trade flows. 
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Table 4. Estimates with Eurozone-Distance Interactions 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Cultural Distance-
Eurozone 
Interaction 
Institutional Distance-Eurozone  
Interaction 
   
Log GDP Exporter 0.985*** 0.989*** 
 (64.50) (63.13) 
Log GDP Importer 0.866*** 0.874*** 
 (47.98) (49.14) 
Log GDP/cap Exporter 0.213*** 0.238*** 
 (5.442) (5.998) 
Log GDP/cap Importer -0.0862 -0.126** 
 (-1.560) (-2.257) 
Log Distance -1.278*** -1.285*** 
 (-30.21) (-30.61) 
Border dummy 0.169*** 0.157*** 
 (2.845) (2.728) 
Cultural Distance -0.107*** -0.0508*** 
 (-5.009) (-4.164) 
Institutional Distance -0.0234** -0.0957*** 
 (-2.284) (-6.527) 
Inst. Quality Exporter 0.686*** 0.706*** 
 (16.76) (17.20) 
Inst. Quality Importer 0.374*** 0.395*** 
 (8.518) (8.947) 
1 Eurozone Member -0.0634 -0.109* 
 (-0.897) (-1.766) 
2 Eurozone Members  0.177** 0.00175 
 (2.134) (0.0248) 
1 EZ Member x CultDist 0.0795***  
 (3.546)  
2 EZ Members x CultDist 0.0345  
 (1.074)  
1 EZ Member x InstDist  0.0976*** 
  (6.107) 
2 EZ Members x InstDist  0.145*** 
  (5.848) 
Constant -36.07*** -36.21*** 
 (-37.02) (-37.19) 
   
Observations 2,757 2,757 
R-squared 0.892 0.894 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; dependent variable: log(exp 1 to 2); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Section 6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
To summarize, the above gravity model estimations show that, while the GDP of 
the exporting and importing countries and the distance between them determine a 
large part of variations in trade flows among European countries, measures of 
cultural and institutional distance and institutional quality are statistically 
significant in their relationship with trade flows. The role of institutional quality 
in each of the countries in a trading pair is the greatest of these three parameters, 
and once controlled for, weakens the effect of a country’s GDP per capita on trade 
flows.   
When controlling for the cultural and institutional distance of country 
pairs, the trade effect of being in the Eurozone is minimal. Indeed, after including 
the Eurozone dummies and thus holding constant Eurozone membership, the 
coefficients on cultural and institutional distance remained negative and 
significant. Yet, the institutional quality in the countries in a trading pair does 
seem to be related to Eurozone membership. Dropping measures of institutional 
quality renders the Eurozone dummies again insignificant. The variables 
measuring institutional quality strengthen the trade impact of adopting the euro, 
generating a significantly positive trade boost from being a Eurozone member. 
The result that Eurozone membership and institutional quality are jointly 
significant implies that institutional quality impacts trade flows even within the 
Eurozone.  
After including interaction terms between the Eurozone membership 
dummies and cultural and institutional distance measurements, it appears that 
cultural distance plays an equally strong role regardless of whether both countries 
in a pair use the euro. However, the role of institutional distance in determining 
trade flows appears to be neutralized when Eurozone countries are trading with 
each other, indicating that, while quality of institutions still matters, institutional 
similarity does not for Eurozone trading parternships. 
The analysis of this paper could be strengthened in a couple of ways. The 
inclusion of a multilateral trade resistance term, measuring relative trading costs, 
might remove bias caused by the proximity of large economies like Germany and 
France in diverting trade between otherwise similar economies (see Anderson, 
Van Wincoop 2004). Controlling for the distortion caused by large European 
economies might cause cultural and institutional distance to have a changed 
impact on trade flows. This analysis might also benefit from sensitivity tests to the 
other measures of culture and institutions that exist. Additionally, an analysis of 
this sort could benefit from expansion of the sample size. It could be that most of 
the trade in Europe happens between Eurozone, regardless of institutional and 
cultural differences, which could bias results in a sample that only includes 
European countries. In a perfect world, one would be able to have large and 
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identical groupings of countries and administer a “treatment” that is the adoption 
of a common currency by one of the groupings. Though this is not a perfect 
world, a better study design likely exists and might shed more light on the impact 
of common currencies, culture, and institutions on trade flows. 
Of course, it is still relatively early days for the euro as a common 
currency in Europe. Assuredly, cultures and institutions are slow to change, and if 
quality of institutions is related to the rate of change of the institutions in a 
country, this could further exacerbate disparities. It could very well be that 
adoption of the euro has not yet had enough time to “bridge” the gaps of 
institutional quality between Eurozone countries, or might never. It does appear 
that institutional differences do have smaller effects on trade within the Eurozone. 
This suggests that Eurozone countries with relatively weaker institutions should 
focus on improving the absolute quality of their governance and not conforming 
to their fellow currency union members’ institutional standards. The results of this 
analysis have promising implications for the future of the Eurozone, yet events 
such as Europe’s on-going debt crisis and its response to the migrant crisis are 
indications that differences and obstacles exist that are likely to prevent quicker 
synchronization of European sentiments and economies.  
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Appendix A: Countries in the sample 
For 2002-2006: 
Countries not in Eurozone Countries in Eurozone 
Bulgaria Austria 
Czech Republic Belgium-Luxembourg* 
Denmark Finland 
Estonia France 
Hungary Germany 
Malta Greece 
Norway Ireland 
Poland Italy 
Romania Netherlands 
Slovak Republic Portugal 
Sweden Spain 
Switzerland - 
United Kingdom - 
*Standard trade data counts Belgium and Luxembourg as one entity and 
aggregates their trade 
 
Appendix B: Description of Data 
 
Variables in dataset, with each observation being a country pair containing 
Country 1 and Country 2: 
- Year 
- FOB Exports from Country 1 to Country 2 in constant USD 
- CIF Imports into Country 2 from Country 1 in constant USD 
- Border, equal to 1 if Country 1 and Country 2 share a land border, 0 
otherwise 
- Colony, equal to 1 if Country 1 and Country 2 were ever in a colonial 
relationship, 0 otherwise 
- Language, equal to 1 if Country 1 and Country 2 share a language, 0 
otherwise 
- GDP of Country 1 in real USD, from World Bank 
- GDP of Country 2 in real USD, from World Bank 
- GDP per capita of Country 1 in real USD, from World Bank 
- GDP per capita of Country 2 in real USD, from World Bank 
- Landlocked, 0 if neither countries are landlock, 1 if one is, 2 if both are 
- Log Distance, log of straight line distance between capitals of the country 
pair 
- SingleEZ, equal to 1 if one country in the pair uses the Euro, 0 otherwise 
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- DualEZ, equal to 1 if both countries use the Euro, 0 otherwise 
- Institutional Quality1, arithmetic average of WGI dimension scores for 
Country 1 
- Institutional Quality2, arithmetic average of WGI dimension scores for 
Country 2 
- Institutional Distance between Country 1 and Country 2, see Section 3 
- Cultural Distance between Country 1 and Country 2, see Section 3 
- The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, across 6 
dimensions: 
 
1. Voice and Accountability: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, 
including terrorism.  
3. Government Effectiveness: Reflects perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies. 
4. Regulatory Quality: Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. 
5. Rule of Law: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
6. Control of Corruption: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
 
Geert Hofstede’s 4 Dimensions of National Culture 
 
1. Power Distance: the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power 
is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but 
defined from below, not from above.  
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2. Uncertainty Avoidance: deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel 
either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations.  
3. Individualism: On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties 
between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after her/himself 
and her/his immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups 
4. Masculinity: versus its opposite, femininity, refers to the distribution of 
emotional roles between the genders which is another fundamental issue for 
any society to which a range of solutions are found.  
 
Appendix C: Standardized Coefficients  
 
I. Relative Contributions of Independent Variables to Trade Variation, Basic 
Specification 
Variables, taken from 
Basic Specification 
(Table 1) 
Standardized 
Beta, % 
Trade Effect if 
Dummy=1 
Log GDP Exporter 54 - 
Log GDP Importer 44 - 
Log GDP/cap Exporter 9 - 
Log GDP/cap Importer 14 - 
Log Distance 31 - 
Border dummy 5 39% 
Language dummy 2 -16% 
 
II. Relative Contributions of Independent Variables to Trade Variation, 
Cultural and Institutional Specification 
Variables, taken from 
Table 2, Column 3 
Standardized Beta, % Trade Effect if 
Dummy=1 
Log GDP Exporter 56 - 
Log GDP Importer 49 - 
Log GDP/cap Exporter 5 - 
Log GDP/cap Importer 2 - 
Log Distance 30 - 
Border dummy 4 33% 
Language dummy 3 -20% 
Cultural Distance 5 - 
Institutional Distance 2 - 
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Inst. Quality Exporter 14 - 
Inst. Quality Importer 8 - 
 
III. Relative Contributions of Independent Variables to Trade Variation, 
Eurozone Dummies Specification 
 
Variables, taken from 
Table 3 (Column 2) 
Standardized Beta, % Trade Effect if 
Dummy=1 
Log GDP Exporter 55 - 
Log GDP Importer 48 - 
Log GDP/cap Exporter 4 - 
Log GDP/cap Importer 2 - 
Log Distance 31 - 
Border dummy 3 25% 
Language dummy 3 -18% 
Cultural Distance 4 - 
Institutional Distance 2 - 
Inst. Quality Exporter 15 - 
Inst. Quality Importer 8 - 
1 EZ Member dummy 2 12% 
2 EZ Members dummy 5 30% 
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